In this chapter, we provide a practical example of how to hack your first IoT device and dive into the world of hardware hacking.
I found an old Asus RT-N12 D1 router in my basement, which had been replaced long ago and was laying around. A perfect candidate for a hardware hacking project!
Spoiler: I successfully identified a vulnerability, which led to Asus updating CVE-2024-28326 to include the RT-N12 D1 model.
Reconnaissance
OSINT
The first step in any hardware hacking project is research. I started by Googling the router model number, "ASUS RT-N12 D1", and came across an article about a similar model, the ASUS RT-N12+ B1. The article mentioned that the device had an open UART interface allowing unauthenticated root access. However, it provided no exact details on how to exploit this or where the UART interface might be located. Could my router model have the same vulnerability?
To gather more information, I turned to the FCC ID printed on the back of the router:
In the United States, any device that uses RF communication, such as a router, must have an FCC ID. The Federal Communications Commission publishes detailed reports, including internal photos of devices. This allows us to inspect the internal hardware without even opening the device!
Upon reviewing the FCC documentation, I noticed four connector pads on the top-right section of the PCB. This layout is very typical for a UART interface, which usually consists of four pins: RX, TX, VCC, and GND.
Open the device
With enough reconnaissance completed, it was time to open the router and take a closer look at the hardware. The primary goals were:
Identifying components of interest (e.g., flash chips, RAM).
Locating debug ports and interfaces.
Tip: Always take photos of your device and label components as you identify them—this will help you stay organized.
As we can see next to the flash chip there are 4 connector pins. Using a multimeter, we can try to identify each of the pins performing a continuity test. For that we need test points for ground and power. We can use the GND and VCC pins of the flash chip as a reference, since we can look them up on the datasheet of the flash chip.
Using this method we can easily identify GND and VCC. To distinguish TX and RX pins, we can power on the device and see that one of the pin has a fluctuating voltage ranging from 1.8 to 3.3 V. This pin should be the TX pin of the UART interface. Hence, we got this layout:
Interface Interaction
To interact with the UART interface, I used a USB-to-UART TTL adapter. The connections were made as follows:
Router TX → Adapter RX
Router RX → Adapter TX
GND → Adapter GND
Note: Instead of soldering the GND pin, I used a clip on the flash chip for simplicity.
With everything connected, I used Minicom to set the baud rate to 115200 and powered on the router. Immediately, the boot log was printed!
Extend to see the full bootlog
Decompressing...done
CFE version 5.100.138.9 based on BBP 1.0.37 for BCM947XX (32bit,SP,LE)
Build Date: 二 10月 2 17:29:48 CST 2012 (root@raymonddev-vm)
Copyright (C) 2000-2008 Broadcom Corporation.
Init Arena
Init Devs.
Boot partition size = 131072(0x20000)
Found an ST compatible serial flash with 128 64KB blocks; total size 8MB
et0: Broadcom BCM47XX 10/100/1000 Mbps Ethernet Controller 5.100.138.9
CPU type 0x19749: 300MHz
Tot mem: 32768 KBytes
CFE mem: 0x80700000 - 0x80799720 (628512)
Data: 0x8072F560 - 0x80732790 (12848)
BSS: 0x80732790 - 0x80733720 (3984)
Heap: 0x80733720 - 0x80797720 (409600)
Stack: 0x80797720 - 0x80799720 (8192)
Text: 0x80700000 - 0x8072F560 (193888)
Device eth0: hwaddr 78-24-AF-CC-A4-84, ipaddr 192.168.200.100, mask 255.255.255.0
gateway not set, nameserver not set
end of nvram_rescuegpio_init
Loader:raw Filesys:tftp Dev:eth0 File:: Options:(null)
Loading: CFE works as TFTP Server.
Failed.
Could not load :: Timeout occured
Loader:raw Filesys:raw Dev:flash0.os File: Options:(null)
Loading: .. 5100 bytes read
Entry at 0x80001000
Closing network.
Starting program at 0x80001000
start_kernel
Linux version 2.6.22.19 (root@asus) (gcc version 4.2.4) #1 Thu Mar 12 11:45:07 CST 2020
CPU revision is: 00019749
Found an ST compatible serial flash with 128 64KB blocks; total size 8MB
Determined physical RAM map:
memory: 02000000 @ 00000000 (usable)
Built 1 zonelists. Total pages: 8128
Kernel command line: root=/dev/mtdblock2 noinitrd console=ttyS0,115200
Primary instruction cache 32kB, physically tagged, 4-way, linesize 32 bytes.
Primary data cache 32kB, 4-way, linesize 32 bytes.
Synthesized TLB refill handler (20 instructions).
Synthesized TLB load handler fastpath (32 instructions).
Synthesized TLB store handler fastpath (32 instructions).
Synthesized TLB modify handler fastpath (31 instructions).
PID hash table entries: 128 (order: 7, 512 bytes)
CPU: BCM53572 rev 1 pkg 8 at 300 MHz
Using 150.000 MHz high precision timer.
console [ttyS0] enabled
Dentry cache hash table entries: 4096 (order: 2, 16384 bytes)
Inode-cache hash table entries: 2048 (order: 1, 8192 bytes)
Memory: 28924k/32768k available (2452k kernel code, 3844k reserved, 495k data, 160k init, 0k highmem)
Mount-cache hash table entries: 512
NET: Registered protocol family 16
PCI: no core
PCI: no core
PCI: Fixing up bus 0
NET: Registered protocol family 2
Time: MIPS clocksource has been installed.
IP route cache hash table entries: 1024 (order: 0, 4096 bytes)
TCP established hash table entries: 1024 (order: 1, 8192 bytes)
TCP bind hash table entries: 1024 (order: 0, 4096 bytes)
TCP: Hash tables configured (established 1024 bind 1024)
TCP reno registered
squashfs: version 3.2-r2 (2007/01/15) Phillip Lougher
io scheduler noop registered (default)
HDLC line discipline: version $Revision: 4.8 $, maxframe=4096
N_HDLC line discipline registered.
Serial: 8250/16550 driver $Revision: 1.90 $ 4 ports, IRQ sharing disabled
serial8250: ttyS0 at MMIO 0xb8000300 (irq = 8) is a 16550A
PPP generic driver version 2.4.2
MPPE/MPPC encryption/compression module registered
NET: Registered protocol family 24
PPPoL2TP kernel driver, V0.18.3
PPTP driver version 0.8.5
pflash: found no supported devices
Creating 5 MTD partitions on "sflash":
0x00000000-0x00020000 : "pmon"
0x00020000-0x007f0000 : "linux"
0x0011bf4c-0x00710000 : "rootfs"
0x007f0000-0x00800000 : "nvram"
0x00770000-0x007f0000 : "jffs2"
dev_nvram_init: _nvram_init
_nvram_init: allocat header: 2151579648, size= 32768
sdhci: Secure Digital Host Controller Interface driver
sdhci: Copyright(c) Pierre Ossman
u32 classifier
OLD policer on
Netfilter messages via NETLINK v0.30.
nf_conntrack version 0.5.0 (512 buckets, 4096 max)
ip_tables: (C) 2000-2006 Netfilter Core Team
net/ipv4/netfilter/tomato_ct.c [Mar 12 2020 11:44:11]
NET: Registered protocol family 1
NET: Registered protocol family 10
ip6_tables: (C) 2000-2006 Netfilter Core Team
NET: Registered protocol family 17
802.1Q VLAN Support v1.8 Ben Greear <greearb@candelatech.com>
All bugs added by David S. Miller <davem@redhat.com>
VFS: Mounted root (squashfs filesystem) readonly.
Freeing unused kernel memory: 160k freed
Warning: unable to open an initial console.
1: set_action 0
firmware version: 3.0.0.4.380_8292-ge6e0d75d7df
[1 init:init_nvram +5] init_nvram for model(29)
num_of_mssid_support(0x0089): [mssid] support [3] mssid
ctf: module license 'Proprietary' taints kernel.
et_module_init: passivemode set to 0x0
hotplug net INTERFACE=eth0 ACTION=add
eth0: Broadcom BCM47XX 10/100/1000 Mbps Ethernet Controller 5.110.27.20012
set_wltxpower(0x01d0): [rc] no Power Control on this model
hotplug net INTERFACE=eth0 ACTION=add
wl_module_init: passivemode set to 0x0
hotplug net INTERFACE=eth1 ACTION=add
eth1: Broadcom BCM4347 802.11 Wireless Controller 5.110.27.20012
hotplug net INTERFACE=eth1 ACTION=add
start_logger:
Algorithmics/MIPS FPU Emulator v1.5
/ # _ifconfig: name=eth0 flags=1043 IFUP addr=(null) netmask=(null)
hotplug net INTERFACE=vlan0 ACTION=add
hotplug net INTERFACE=vlan0 ACTION=add
hotplug net INTERFACE=vlan1 ACTION=add
hotplug net INTERFACE=vlan1 ACTION=add
update_lan_state(lan_, 0, 0)
start_lan: setting up the bridge br0
hotplug net INTERFACE=br0 ACTION=add
vlan0: cmd=14: Operation not supported
_ifconfig: name=vlan0 flags=1243 IFUP addr=(null) netmask=(null)
start_lan: setting MAC of br0 bridge to 78:24:AF:CC:A4:84
hotplug net INTERFACE=br0 ACTION=add
_ifconfig: name=eth1 flags=1243 IFUP addr=(null) netmask=(null)
generate_wl_para(0x0a6f): unit 0 subunit -1
num_of_mssid_support(0x0089): [mssid] support [3] mssid
generate_wl_para(0x0d8d): bw: 1
generate_wl_para(0x0d92): channel: 0
generate_wl_para(0x0d93): nbw_cap: 1
generate_wl_para(0x0d94): nctrlsb: lower
generate_wl_para(0x0d96): obss_coex: 1
generate_wl_para(0x0a6f): unit 0 subunit 1
generate_wl_para(0x0a6f): unit 0 subunit 2
generate_wl_para(0x0a6f): unit 0 subunit 3
_ifconfig: name=br0 flags=1243 IFUP addr=192.168.1.1 netmask=255.255.255.0
_ifconfig: name=lo flags=1043 IFUP addr=127.0.0.1 netmask=255.0.0.0
route_manip: cmd=ADD name=lo addr=127.0.0.0 netmask=255.0.0.0 gateway=0.0.0.0 metric=0
update_lan_state(lan_, 1, 0)
start_lan 1928
udhcpc_lan:: deconfig
deconfig_lan: IFUP.
_ifconfig: name=br0 flags=1243 IFUP addr=192.168.1.1 netmask=255.255.255.0
lan_down(br0)
route_manip: cmd=DEL name=br0 addr=0.0.0.0 netmask=0.0.0.0 gateway=192.168.200.1 metric=0
update_lan_state(lan_, 4, 0)
done
# wanduck: Got LAN(-1) information:
wanduck: delay 1 seconds before the first detect...
[1 init:start_dnsmasq +12] begin
[1 init:stop_dnsmasq +12] begin
[1 init:stop_dnsmasq +12] end
start_lan_port(0) 1
TZ watchdog
wanduck: delay 2 seconds before the first detect...
illegal, cannot enable DualWAN
vlan0: cmd=14: Operation not supported
wanduck: delay 3 seconds before the first detect...
[1 init:init_main +14] recv signal 14 from pid [1:/sbin/init] (from user)
wanduck: delay 4 seconds before the first detect...
[1 init:init_main +15] recv signal 14 from pid [1:/sbin/init] (from user)
wanduck: delay 5 seconds before the first detect...
/ # udhcpc_lan:: leasefail
/ #
/ #
/ #
Even better: once the router finished booting, the UART interface provided an unauthenticated root shell!
Post Exploitation
With root access, I could analyze the router’s internals:
Inspect running processes
Check installed programs
Retrieve sensitive information
For example, if you ever forget your router’s password, you can simply read it in plaintext:
Responsible Disclosure
I responsibly reported the vulnerability to Asus, which led to the following timeline:
18.11.2024 – Received an email from Asus suggesting I update to the latest firmware and retry. They also noted that the "model has been End-of-Life (EOL) for several years and will no longer receive firmware maintenance."
18.11.2024 – Confirmed the vulnerability still exists in the latest firmware and submitted detailed findings to Asus.
17.12.2024 – Asus acknowledged the vulnerability and updated CVE-2024-28326 to include the RT-N12 D1 router.
